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Catching up with the West: A Perspective on Asian Economic Development 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Following closely my remit, this paper reviews and assesses Asian economic development in 
the recent post-1980 period, as well as over the somewhat longer time-span since WWII.  Its 
chief purpose is to draw analytical and policy implications from this experience. This is a 
challenging but pleasant task, since, conceived at least in narrow economic terms (growth of per 
capita incomes), the Asian story is generally speaking one of outstanding success.  Indeed, it 
would be no exaggeration to say that post-World War II economic expansion in a number of 
Asian countries are the most successful examples of industrialization and fast growth over a 
sustained period in the entire history of mankind.  Recall that Japan in 1950  produced less 
than 5 million tonnes of crude steel per annum and a little over 30 thousand motor vehicles of 
all types.  The US output of steel at that time was nearly 90 million tonnes and it produced 
about 7 million automobiles per year.  By the mid-1970s the Japanese had caught up with the 
US in the production of steel and replaced West Germany as the world's largest exporter of cars. 
By 1980 Japan overtook the US to become the largest producer of automobiles in the world. 
 
The Japanese experience has by no means been unique.  It was self-consciously emulated by 
countries like Korea and Taiwan, with results that are perhaps even more spectacular.  In 1955, 
Korea was unequivocally industrially backward.  Its net value of manufacturing output per head 
was US$8 compared with US$7 in India and US$60 in Mexico.
1
  Since then, Korea has 
managed to transform itself from being largely an agricultural society to the point where it is the 
second most important country in the world (through its firm Samsung) in electronic memory 
chip (DRAM) technology.  By the year 2000, the country is expected to become the fourth 
largest car producer in the world.  Nothing could be more symptomatic of the changing map of 
world industry when reversing historic roles, a hitherto developing country like Korea becomes 
a chief foreign direct investor in the heart of the industrial West, i.e. the UK.
2
 
 
The 1980s have been rightly termed the "lost decade" for countries on the other two developing 
continents, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.  However, notwithstanding this 
enormous setback to development on these two continents, as well as slower economic growth 
in the world as a whole, the Asian industrialization and catch-up drive has continued unabated 
in the 1980s and into the 1990s.  As we shall see below, economic expansion in Asia during 
this period has not just been confined to a few countries,but has been widespread.  It has 
involved rising standards of living for billions of people, much of the human population. 
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  Maizels (1963), cited in Amsden and Hikino (1994). 
    
2
 The Korean giant LG Group recently decided to install a factory in Wales and invest 
US$2.6 billion.  This is apparently the largest single investment in the European Union from 
outside the member states.  (See further, The Economist, p.24, July 13, 1996.) 
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Understanding and making analytical sense of this extraordinary Asian drama is indeed a 
heartening but rather vast task.  There is also no consensus on what are the right lessons to be 
learnt from the East or South East Asian experience, let alone on whether or not these lessons 
are applicable elsewhere in the new conditions of the liberal and globalised world economy.  
Therefore, to keep this paper in manageable limits, its analytical part will be confined to an 
examination of a small number of relevant issues. 
 
Specifically, the paper will concentrate on the extraordinarily high rates of savings and 
investment,  particularly those of the private corporate sector, of  these highly successful Asian 
economies.  In fact, the corporation itself and the relationship between the corporation and the 
government will receive special analytical attention.   
 
These emphases on the corporation, savings and investment, it will be argued, are not only more 
significant for the emerging post-Uruguay Round global economic order, but they also provide 
the microeconomic dimension which is normally missing from the vast literature in this field.  
Such emphases are also more directly relevant for any lessons that might be drawn for the Latin 
American economies. 
 
However, before the paper proceeds to an analysis of the above issues, the next section will set 
out in quantitative terms the main features of Asian economic development in a comparative 
international perspective.  Section III will outline the more important analytical and policy 
questions raised by this record, of which only a small subset will be closely examined in the 
sections that follow. 
 
 
II.  Asian economic development in a comparative international context 
 
Some important features of Asian economic development over the last three decades or so are 
summarised in tables 1 to 6.  The following points which emerge from these tables as well from 
other available information (not reproduced here) deserve attention. 
 
 
1.  As table 1 indicates, in the last fifteen years, developing East Asia has been by far the most 
dynamic region of the world economy.  Although the East Asian economies were growing very 
fast even in the previous fifteen years (1965-1980), the gap between their growth rates and those 
of other developing regions, such as Latin America, was relatively small (7.3% vs. 6% for Latin 
America).  However, in the 1980s, economic growth collapsed in Latin America (from 6% per 
annum to 1.6% per annum) while there was a trend increase in East Asian economic growth to 
7.8% per annum. 
 
2.  Disaggregated data by sector (table 1) suggests that it was not poor agricultural but rather 
the abysmal industrial performance which was responsible for the collapse of economic growth 
in Latin America in the 1980s.  Nevertheless, East Asia did record particularly strong 
agricultural growth during that decade.  
 
3.  In reflecting on East Asian economic expansion, the Chinese economy, because of the size 
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of the country's population, deserves special consideration.  As disaggregated data for 
individual countries in table 3 shows, the Chinese economy expanded at a rate of nearly 10% 
per annum in the 1980s, a shade below the Korean pace.  In the 1990s, the Chinese growth rate 
has been even faster and somewhat greater than Korea's.  However, the important point is that 
when a South Korea grows at 10% a year for fifteen years, this is an extraordinary achievement 
for the world to take note.  However, when China with a billion people achieves a similar 
growth rate, this is not just extraordinary, but an epoch-making event. 
 
4.  Turning to the other main populous country, India, its performance until 1980 was relatively 
poor by international standards.  However, since then there has been a marked improvement.  
During the 1980s, India was one of the few countries in the world to have achieved a significant 
trend increase in its growth rate.  While table 3 indicates some subsequent deterioration in 
performance between 1990 and 1994, if the 1995 data is included - when the economy grew at 
7% a year and industry for the first time achieved growth rates similar to those seen in the East 
Asian NICs - the overall picture for the 1990s becomes more positive. 
 
5.  Apart from the important differences in the pace of economic development of the East 
Asian and South Asian countries like India, it is customary and analytically useful to distinguish 
between two groups of countries within East Asia - specifically between North East (Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan
3
) and South East (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia
4
) Asian countries.  The 
latter group of countries have followed rather different economic policies to those in North East 
Asian nations but have been just as successful during the last decade. 
 
However, in this context UNCTAD (1996) observes that although the recent economic record 
of these two groups is indeed similar, taking a longer perspective reveals a significant 
performance gap between the groups.  The exact result will depend on which periods and 
which countries have been considered, but the annual per capita GDP growth rates of Japan and 
the first-tier NICs have, on average, been roughly 2 percentage points higher than those of the 
second-tier NICs over the last three decades or so.  The cumulative impact of this growth gap 
over 30 years is significant.  For example, Malaysia's per capita income in 1961 was almost 
three times that of Korea's and almost twice that of Taiwan, (Malaysia then included Singapore, 
so purely "Malaysian" income would have been somewhat lower).  It remained higher than the 
Korean per capita income until 1981, but in 1993 was less than half that of Korea, and about 
one-third that of Taiwan.
5
 
 
6.  The Asian countries excellent record of economic growth during the last fifteen years has 
certainly translated into impressive increases in the average standards of living of the 
population, reductions in poverty, increasing real wages and rising employment. 
 
(a)Adjustment to GDP growth rate figures in table 1 for the rates of growth of population, terms 
                                                 
    
3
 Korea and Taiwan are also referred to as the "first-tier" NICs 
    
4
 These are also referred to as "second-tier" NICs 
    
5
 See further UNCTAD (1996), page 13. 
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of trade and net factor payments abroad, suggest that during the 1980s average 
per capita income in Asian countries rose by fifty percent.  This compares with 
a decline of 15 percent in Latin America and 25 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(UN, 1990). 
 
(b)ILO (1995) provides evidence that in the 1980s, in the fast-growing East and South East 
Asian economies such as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, labour 
shortages emerged and there was significant immigration of labour from 
neighbouring low-income countries.  Manufacturing employment rose at a rate 
of over 6 percent per annum during this decade in these dynamic economies 
whilst, at the same time, real earnings increased at an average rate of 5 percent 
per annum. 
 
(c)With respect to poverty, available evidence for the 1980s for individual fast-growing NICs, 
suggests sizeable reductions in its incidence. Thus in China the incidence of 
absolute poverty fell from 28 percent of the population in 1980 to 10 percent in 
1990; in Indonesia the corresponding reduction was from 29 to 15 percent; in the 
Republic of Korea from 10 to 5 percent, and in Malaysia from 9 to 2 percent.   
 
(d)A remarkable feature of East and South East Asian development during the relevant period 
has been that not only has the rate of growth been very high, but income 
distribution has become more rather than less equal. World Bank (1993) notes 
"For the eight HPAEs, rapid growth and declining inequality have been shared 
virtues, as comparisons over time of equality and growth using Gini coefficients 
illustrate".
6
 
 
The above positive East Asian record stands in striking  contrast to that of Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the recent period. ILO (1995) reports that in Latin America between 1980 
and 1992, there was a steady fall in modern sector employment, with paid employment falling at 
a rate of 0.1 percent per annum during the 1980s. This reversed the trend of the previous three 
decades when steady economic growth had led to a significant expansion of modern-sector 
employment. In most Latin American countries, the average real wage fell during the 1980s, 
recovering in only a few countries towards the end of the decade. Minimum wage fell on 
average by 24 percent in real terms across the region, while average earnings in the informal 
sector declined by 42 percent.  
 
 
III.  Analytical and policy issues 
 
The central analytical and policy question raised by East Asian economic experience is of 
course, what are the causes of the fast economic growth in these countries?  
 
There is no agreement on this question. Indeed, there is a continuing controversy in which the 
                                                 
    
6
 It will be argued below that this conclusion of declining inequality may require some 
important qualifications. 
  
 
 5 
main protagonists are the World Bank with some orthodox economists on one side and a 
number of academic economists, not all of whom are heterodox, on the other.
7
 This debate is 
important for two reasons.  Firstly, the World Bank professes to base its policy 
recommendations for countries around the globe on what it regards as the lessons to be drawn 
from the experience of these highly successful East Asian countries.  Secondly, from an 
analytical point of view, the debate is clearly of central importance, precisely because of the fast 
growth of these economies over a sustained period.  Thus, the resolution of this debate would 
inevitably have an important bearing on our general ideas on growth and development. 
 
 
With the publication of World Bank (1993), Singh (1994b) notes that there has been some 
useful narrowing of differences between the two sides, but there remains a wide gulf on a range 
of significant issues. These have been reviewed and commented on in Singh (1995a). The more 
important ones are: 
 
(i)   the question of the effectiveness of industrial policy; 
 
(ii)  the issue of "openness": how open were the East Asian economies during their periods of 
fast growth? 
 
(iii) the nature of competition in domestic product and capital markets; 
 
(iv)  the role of savings and investment in East Asian economic growth; 
 
(v)   the question why the Asian countries did not have a debt crisis while the Latin Americans 
did; 
 
(vi)  the relationship between technology policy, industrial policy and international 
competitiveness; 
 
(vii)  the relationship between the "fundamentals", macroeconomic stability and industrial 
policy. 
 
An analysis and resolution of these issues will determine what are the right lessons to be learned 
from the East Asian economic model or models. However, the economic record of these 
countries also raises other significant issues which are listed below. 
 
Firstly, can the Asian experience be replicated? Apart from anything else, it is suggested that the 
international economic environment is totally different to-day from that in which the East Asian 
NICs achieved their formidable success.  For example, in the post-Uruguay round emerging 
world trading order, many of the interventionist industrial and commercial policy instruments 
used by Japan, Korea and other countries will no longer be permissible.
8
 
                                                 
    
7
 See World Bank (1991, 1993); Amsden (1994a); Fishlow et al (1994); Ito and Krueger 
(1995); Singh (1994b, 1995a). 
    
8
 See further Singh (1996a); ODI (1995); UNCTAD (1995); Greenaway and Milner (1995); 
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Secondly, is fast East Asian economic growth sustainable in the direct, narrow sense of the 
term? The subject draws its significance from the following considerations: (a) the slow-down 
in the Japanese economy in the 1990s which may be expected to have adverse effects on 
economic growth in other countries in the region; (b) secondly, the large current account deficits 
of the second-tier NICs and hence their vulnerability to capital outflows. It will be recalled that 
prior to 1980, countries like Brazil had been growing fast for a considerable period. Then 
suddenly Brazil, Mexico and the rest of the Latin America stumbled into a decade long crisis.  
In the current situation, given their present vulnerability to surges of capital flows, what is there 
to stop a similar fate being visited on the South East Asian NICs? 
 
Thirdly, an alternative view to that above is that there now exists among the East and South East 
Asian countries a large degree of economic co-operation.  This has fostered a regional dynamic 
which has acquired an autonomy of its own. These factors, it is suggested,  would allow these 
countries to sustain high rates of economic growth regardless of the state of the world economy 
including that of Japan. Indeed, some would argue that currency appreciation and slower 
economic growth in Japan help developing East Asian countries positively by leading to greater 
Japanese FDI in these countries.
9
 
 
Fourthly, there are special analytical issues raised by the epoch-making Chinese record. 
Specifically, if freely functioning internal and external markets are essential for economic 
growth as the Bretton Woods Institutions routinely insist, how have the Chinese been able to 
grow so fast with such low levels of development of capital and labour markets and highly 
segmented product markets?  Similarly, the Chinese experience raises the important question 
whether privatisation of the means of production is at all necessary for adequate (from the 
perspective of achieving fast economic growth) development of markets to occur.
10
 
 
These are all large questions and cannot be properly treated within the confines of this paper. 
The rest of the paper therefore limits itself to only one of the main themes above, namely, what 
are the right lessons from the Asian experience. But even within that context, the paper 
considers just one of the main issues, that of savings and investment. How have the East Asian 
economies been able to achieve such high rates of savings and investments, particularly in the 
private corporate sector. This involves inter alia an analysis of the relationship between the 
government, the corporation and the financial system in these exemplar economies. 
 
This analysis therefore departs from the old debate about industrial policy and getting prices 
"right" or "wrong". It hopefully will shed some useful light on an important dynamic aspect of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Agosin, Tussie and Crespi (1995). 
    
9
 See further, UNCTAD (1996). 
    
10
 For the view of the Bretton Woods Institutions on the necessity of free and flexible 
markets for fostering economic growth, the classic statement is World Bank (1991).  For the 
difficulties that the Chinese experience over the last 15 years creates for this thesis, see Singh 
(1994a, 1996e). 
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the East Asian experience and may also have implications for Latin American countries which 
are afflicted with the problem of low savings and investment rates.  
 
 
IV.  Savings, investment and total factor productivity growth in East Asia. 
 
The successful East Asian countries are today characterised by very high rates of savings and 
investments, but this was not always the case.  As Tables 2 and 3 which report savings and 
investment rates for nine Asian and nine Latin American countries indicate, the median Asian 
economy saved and invested nearly 30% of its GDP in the 1990s compared with a figure of 
about 20% for the Latin American countries.  In the 1950s and 1960s the Latin Americans were 
saving and investing appreciably more than the Asians (see column 1 of Tables 2 and 3).  
Between 1955 and 1965 domestic savings in Korea were only 3.3% of GDP compared with 
over 35% in the 1990s. 
 
UNCTAD (1994) notes with respect to Japan that gross domestic fixed capital formation in that 
country increased from 24 percent of GNP in the early 1950s to almost 40 percent in the 1960s.  
The ratio of private equipment investment to GNP doubled between the early 1950s and the late 
1960s, reaching 17 percent.  In terms of purchasing power parity Summers-Heston data, Young 
(1994) estimates that between 1960 and 1980, gross fixed investment to GDP ratio doubled in 
Taiwan, tripled in Korea and quadrupled in Singapore. 
 
Studies by Young (1994) and Lau and Kim (1994) have established the primacy of the 
accumulation process in accounting for fast economic growth in the East Asian countries within 
the "growth accounting" framework.  These contributions show that the rapid economic 
expansion achieved by these countries could not be attributed to their faster growth of total 
factor productivity (TFP), or the so-called "residual" which is loosely identified with "technical 
progress" in such analysis. Young's empirical results suggested that Korea and Taiwan had 
lower TFP growth than Bangladesh over the period 1970-85.  In other words, in terms of TFP 
methodology, most if not all the economic growth of countries like Korea can be explained by 
the fast expansion of factor inputs, including inter alia capital inputs arising from very high rates 
of capital accumulation. 
 
An interesting neoclassical interpretation of these new empirical findings on TFP growth in East 
Asia is provided by Krugman (1994). He argues, on the basis of these results, that the  high 
growth rates of the East Asian miracle economies are not sustainable. In his view, this is 
because it is unrealistic to expect countries which are already investing 40 per cent of their GDP 
to be able to raise their rate of investment much higher still. Krugman goes on to point out that 
these countries similarly already have highly educated and high quality labour forces, which 
limits the scope for further improvement in these spheres also. In these circumstances, without 
technical progress, eventual decreasing returns to investment will set in and limit the growth 
potential of these economies. 
 
This is, however, not the only possible interpretation of the observed phenomena. Working in 
the tradition of the classical economists and that of Kaldor (1965,1967), Akyuz and Gore (1996) 
and Singh (1996b) suggest on the contrary that high rates of investment lead to greater turnover 
of machines and therefore faster technical change, greater learning by doing, more and quicker 
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product development and hence greater international competitiveness.  Therefore, in this 
alternative non-neoclassical analysis there is no reason why eventual decreasing returns should 
set in with high rates of investment.
11
 
 
The finding of low or zero TFP growth in the East Asian economies has also been interpreted by 
some economists to suggest that there is nothing "miraculous" about these countries' growth 
since it can all be explained by the accumulation of physical and human capital. There is a 
simple neoclassical story which ascribes the former basically to sound 'fundamentals'.  It is 
suggested that prudent macroeconomic management - consequent low rates of inflation  and 
low exchange rate fluctuations - coupled with good initial conditions (land reform, favourable 
human capital endowment) led to fast growth of household incomes.  This in turn generated 
high rates of savings and investment.  In this account, some countries were subject initially to 
financial repression (eg Korea in the mid 1960s).  But once this was eliminated and real interest 
rates became positive, household savings rose further, as did investment.
12
 
 
The analysis below, following the work of Akyuz and Gore and Singh referred to previously, 
presents a more complex view of the accumulation process in East Asia.  It stresses the 
essential role of profits in providing both the inducement to invest and the means to pay for 
investment.  Profits are also of course a consequence of investment. As the propensity to save 
out of profits is greater than that from other sources of income, higher profits also lead to higher 
savings. This investment-profitability-savings nexus was not, however, a spontaneous outcome 
of the invisible hand of the market or simply of "sound fundamentals", but rather government 
policy measures and the government-business interactions were central to generating and 
sustaining it.  At the aggregate level the net result was greatly increased propensities to save 
and invest and the ex-ante equality of savings and investment at high rates of economic growth.  
 
This conceptualisation of the East Asian experience is in the Kaldorian tradition. Instead of 
static resource allocation and getting prices right or wrong, it emphasises the dynamics of the 
accumulation process (mediated through high profits), the associated technical change and the 
growth of productivity. The argument is illustrated below by considering the cases of Japan and 
South Korea. 
 
 
                                                 
    
11
 If a country has zero TFP growth, it does not mean that it has achieved no technical 
progress in the ordinary usage of these terms. This becomes obvious when one considers the 
fact that notwithstanding the absence of TFP growth, the Korean economy, for example, has 
been continuously producing and exporting ever more sophisticated range of products over the 
last three decades. For conceptual critiques of the neoclassical production function and its 
analysis of "technical progress" see among others, Kaldor (1958) and Scott (1989). 
    
12
 World Bank (1993) is a considerable improvement on this orthodox neoclassical analysis. 
It acknowledges that governments in these fast growing East Asian countries adopted a host of 
measures to raise both the levels of savings and investment, as well as to influence the 
allocation of investments. It accepts that fast growing East Asian countries did not eliminate 
financial repression. 
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V.  Investment, profits and savings in Japan in the high growth period (1950-1970) 
 
The period  of post-war Japanese economic history which is most relevant from the perspective 
of developing countries is that of the 1950s and 1960s. This is not only because it was a high 
growth period, but more significantly at the beginning of this time span, the Japanese level of 
industrialisation, as noted before, was not all that different from that of today's semi-industrial 
countries. Indeed in 1952 the value of Japanese exports was lower than that of India's (Krueger, 
1995).   
 
During the two decades 1950-1970, the Japanese economy expanded at a rate of 10% per 
annum; its industrial output rose by 13% per annum, its share in world's exports of 
manufactures increased by 10 percentage points.  These extraordinary growth rates were 
accompanied by very high rates of investment and savings as the data in tables 7 and 8 show. In 
the absence of readily available data for developing countries, the two tables provide 
comparative statistics only for industrial countries. Nevertheless, information that exists for 
other than industrial economies suggests that Japanese investment and saving rates during this 
period were among the highest of all countries - developed, developing or centrally planned.   
 
Two further points in relation to Japanese savings and investment record require particular 
attention. The first is, and it is a central point, that most of this high investment occurred in the 
private sector and in the corporate economy. In view of its relatively small size, the government 
sector's share of total investment in Japan was quite low compared to other countries. Secondly, 
it is notable that savings rates in each sector of the Japanese economy (household, corporate and 
government) were higher than those of other industrial countries in table 8.
13
 
 
Table 9 suggests that Japanese net manufacturing profits as a proportion of manufacturing 
output were generally much higher than those of other industrial countries. In 1970, for 
example, Japanese profits were more than twice as high as those recorded in the UK and the US 
in that year, and almost twice as high as those in Germany and Italy. 
 
 
VI.  The role of the Japanese state 
 
These high Japanese profits arose in important part from heavy state intervention which guided 
the Japanese economy during this period. The government's objectives with respect to such 
intervention were fully articulated in a number of government documents. One of the most 
important of these was: "The Five Year Plan for Economic Independence", issued in 1955, 
following the end of US occupation. The Plan emphasised the inter-locking triad of "growth, 
investment and exports." High rates of investment were required to develop modern industry, to 
shift labour from low productivity to high productivity sectors. Similarly national savings had to 
be mobilised to fund investment. The country could not simply rely on foreign aid to finance its 
investment needs - hence the words "Economic Independence" in the title of the Plan. Similarly, 
exports were necessary to pay for the imports of raw materials, machinery and technology. This 
                                                 
    
13
 The only exception to this statement is that Finland's government savings was slightly 
higher than those of Japan. 
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was thought to be particularly important for a country which was not well endowed with natural 
resources and which no longer had an empire to provide them. 
 
It is important to note that the above analysis of Japan's situation was not just a vision of the 
planners, but widely shared by the public. The latter is exemplified by the popular slogan of the 
period: "prosperity through exports and stability through savings". The overall vision was 
translated into practice by different branches of the government in different ways. Ackley and 
Ishi (1976, p 160-61) provide a useful and instructive account of its macroeconomic 
implications as perceived by the relevant government agencies in this sphere.  These 
implications, according to the two authors, included the following: 
 
(a) Government tax and expenditure policies that would encourage saving, investment and 
exports, including heavy governmental investment in productive (but not in social) 
capital. 
 
(b) A monetary policy involving interest rates and easy credit designed to stimulate highly 
capital-intensive private investment (but not housing or consumer durables) and to 
provide an indirect form of export subsidy. 
 
(c) A significant role for the government as financial intermediary to ensure that adequate 
amounts of both personal and governmental savings flowed to the favoured kinds of 
investments. 
 
(d) The encouragement of a rapid growth of aggregate demand so long as the current 
account of the balance of payments remained positive and export prices did not rise; but 
a readiness to check expansion of demand whenever the continuation of either of these 
conditions was threatened; yet a willingness to tolerate rising domestic prices, especially 
if they supported import-competing domestic production or did not significantly 
encourage imports of consumer goods. 
 
(e) Although never made explicit, the ready sacrifice of stability for growth. 
 
To put it another way, the government had two main proximate objectives:  to attain a current 
account equilibrium at as high a growth rate as possible; to increase the private sector's 
propensities to invest and save so as to substantially raise the long term growth rate of the 
economy. In addition to the macroeconomic measures outlined above, at the microeconomic 
level, the Japanese government sought to achieve these objectives by building up the strength 
and capabilities of its corporations so that these could compete with their counterparts from 
advanced countries in the international market place.  For this purpose a number of measures 
were taken which directly helped increase the resources available for corporate investment. 
These were coupled with a range of indirect policies which affected positively the external 
environment of the corporate sector and thereby also helped raise profits. These measures have 
been discussed in detail in Singh (1996b), and will therefore, only be summarised below. 
 
 
1)  Corporate Fiscal Incentives: The direct policy instruments used by the government to 
promote corporate growth included inter alia a wide range of fiscal incentives.  Tsuru (1993) 
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notes that by the mid-70s Japanese corporations had available to them over 25 tax free reserves 
including for items such as a reserve for price fluctuations, for overseas market development 
and for overseas investment losses. 
 
2)  Domestic Competition Policy: Among the indirect policy measures one of the most 
important was the lax enforcement of anti-trust laws, which helped corporations earn 
supernormal profits.  Anti-trust laws in Japan are regarded not as an end in themselves but as 
an integral part of government's overall industrial policy.  The laws are enforced by the Fair 
Trade Commission which has much less power (and this was particularly true during the high 
growth period) than MITI, the agency in control of industrial policy.  MITI displayed important 
anti-competitive biases: it favoured large firms in the belief that this was essential for competing 
in international markets; it disapproved of 'excessive "competition"' as that may lead to price 
wars and thereby diminish the corporate inducement to invest. 
 
During the high growth period,  MITI encouraged a variety of cartel arrangements in a wide 
range of industries ─ export and import cartels, cartels to combat recession or excessive 
competition, rationalization cartels, etc.
14
  Although these cartels were formed for specific 
periods of time and were not always fully effective, they nevertheless helped restrict 
competition considerably in the domestic product market.  However MITI combined these 
anti-competitive actions simultaneously with vigorous encouragement of domestic oligopolistic 
rivalry among large firms and the promotion of international competitiveness.  MITI's purpose 
in these endeavour was not to achieve pareto efficiency or to maximise consumer welfare but 
rather to promote rapid technological progress and fast growth of productivity in Japanese 
industry.  Okimoto (1989) notes that in general, whether competition was promoted or 
restricted depended on the industry and its life-cycle: in young industries, during the 
developmental phase, the government discouraged competition: when these industries became 
technologically mature, competition was allowed to flourish.  Later, when industries are in 
competitive decline, the government again discourages competition and attempts to bring about 
an orderly rationalisation of the industry.
15
 
 
3)  Import Controls: During the rapid growth period the Japanese government effectively 
protected its industry from external competition by both tariff and particularly non-tariff 
measures.  Although in the 1960s the government started on a program of eliminating or 
relaxing protective measures to conform to OECD norms, protection remained highly effective 
even until the end of the 1970s.  This is indicated by the fact that as late as 1978, manufactured 
imports constituted only 2.4% of the Japanese GDP; the corresponding proportion in Britain and 
other countries of the EEC was five to six times larger.  Even in the US which traditionally, 
because of its continental size, has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported 
manufactured goods in the late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as large as in Japan (see 
                                                 
    
14
 According to Caves and Uekusa (1976), in the 1960s, cartels accounted for 78.1 percent of 
the value of shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 50.0 percent in non-ferrous metals; 
47 percent in printing and publishing; 41.2 percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 percent in steel 
products, and 37.2 percent in food products. 
    
15
  For a fuller discussion of the issues raised see Amsden and Singh (1994). 
  
 
 12 
CEPG,1979). 
 
4)  Low Interest Rates and Policy Based Finance: The government implemented low interest 
rate policy in general and provided through the so-called 'policy based' finance preferential rates 
for MITI's favoured firms and industries.  These lowered the cost of capital, helped increase 
corporate resources for investment and also induced firms to invest according to government's 
priorities.
16
 
 
5)  Administrative Guidance and Coordination and Sequencing of Investment: The government 
also used other important measures for raising and maintaining at a high level the corporate 
propensity to invest. Through its so-called "administrative guidance", the MITI performed the 
important task of addressing the problems of coordination failure which are ubiquitous in the 
real world of incomplete and imperfect markets.  This was especially so during Japan's high 
growth period as what in effect MITI did at that time was to orchestrate investment and 
technological races among oligopolistic firms in favoured industries.  Such races were carefully 
controlled as otherwise excess capacity might have been created which would have adversely 
affected the future corporate inducement to invest. Thus in a number of industries (eg steel) 
undergoing large investment programmes, the government "guided" firms not to all invest at the 
same time but rather to establish new capacity by turn. It is important to appreciate that the 
government's role in Japan, unlike in Soviet type planning, was one of "guidance" of the private 
corporate sector rather than of "command".  MITI's coordinating role was performed through 
extensive consultations with trade associations and through what are known as the 
"deliberations councils".
17
  As Lockwood (1965, pp. 149) observes, 
  
"The industrial bureaus of MITI proliferate sectoral targets and plans; they confer, they 
tinker, they exhort.  This is the economics by admonition to a degree 
inconceivable in Washington or London.  Business makes few major decisions 
without consulting the appropriate governmental authority; the same is true in 
reverse". 
 
In general the measures outlined above led to greater rents and profits for the private corporate 
sector than would otherwise have been the case.  These enabled Japanese firms to undertake 
high rates of investment, to improve the quality of their products, and also to capture markets 
abroad.  The latter was of particular importance to firms, since in return for its favours 
(protection, policy based finance), MITI often imposed on them export and world market share 
performance targets.
18
 To sum up, the most important factors which distinguish Japanese 
government policies at the level of firm and industry from those of other dirigiste economies 
include: 
 
                                                 
    
16
 Shinohara (1982); JDB/JERI (1993). 
    
17
 See further JDB/JERI (1993) and World Bank (1993). 
    
18
 Other kinds of performance standards were also asked for, most notably those involving 
technological upgrading. See further Amsden and Hikino(1994). 
  
 
 13 
(a) emphasis on exports; 
(b) enforcement of strict performance standards; 
(c) maintaining oligopolistic rivalry among large firms in mature industries as opposed to 
promotion of single "national champions" (which many countries are prone to do)
19
; and 
importantly  
(d) the close relationship between government and business. 
 
 
VII.  Profits and savings 
 
The above account of the government's role in sustaining the investment-profits-exports nexus 
is incomplete in two important respects. First, it has not considered the question of savings. 
Secondly the role of the financial system in creating this virtuous circle has not been discussed. 
We take up these issues in turn below. 
 
It was noted earlier that each sector of the Japanese economy saved more than its counterparts 
elsewhere.  High profits and high corporate inducement to invest were clearly in part 
responsible for high corporate savings.  However, as we shall see below the Japanese financial 
system also played a significant part in facilitating such savings. 
 
In addition to encouraging corporate investment and savings,the high profits in the Japanese 
economy were also in part responsible for the high savings propensities of the Japanese 
household sector
20
. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in the Japanese national accounts, the 
unincorporated businesses are included in the household sector. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the incidence of such businesses in the Japanese economy was much greater than in other 
industrial countries. In view of the intense competition these enterprises face, their propensity to 
save and invest out of profits tends to be very high.   
 
The second reason concerns the workers' bonus payments. These payments, which were directly 
linked to profits, constituted sixteen percent of workers' annual incomes in the relevant period. 
There is evidence that during the 1950s and 1960s, the workers regarded the bonuses as 
windfall incomes out of which they had a higher propensity to save than out of their regular 
incomes. UNCTAD (1994).
21
 
                                                 
    
19
 See further Boltho (1976)?? 
    
20
 Akyuz and Gore(1995), UNCTAD(1994). 
    
21
 There are a number of other factors also which can, to some degree, account for the high 
savings propensities of the Japanese household sector [Maddison, 1992; Kojima, 1995; IMF, 
1995]. These include the fast rate of growth of household incomes, the age and employment 
structures of the population, the lack of publicly provided social security. Moreover, low income 
elasticity of demand for foreign goods, the low level of development of financing and credit 
facilities for consumers, formal and informal controls on imports of consumer durables can also 
be expected to have helped play a significant part in keeping household consumption low. See 
Felix (1994). 
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VIII.  The corporation and the financial system in Japan 
 
The evidence of high Japanese profits by comparative international standards presented in the 
previous section has been of a macroeconomic kind - the share of manufacturing profits in total 
manufacturing output. However, we have not considered microeconomic data on the rates of 
return achieved by Japanese manufacturing corporations. Here there is an apparent anomaly 
which highlights the important complementary role of the financial system in sustaining the 
investment-profits-saving nexus in the Japanese economy during the high growth period. 
 
Comparative data on corporate rates of return in the US and Japan, for example, indicate that, 
unlike the share of profits in value added, the US rates of return were considerably greater than 
those earned by Japanese corporations. Kojima (1995) reports that between 1960 and 1964, the 
average rate of return of US manufacturing firms was 6.3 percent per annum and that of 
Japanese corporations was 3.2 percent; for the period 1965 to 1969 the corresponding figures 
were 6.9 percent and 3.3 percent respectively.  These differences in observed rates of return 
could in principle arise simply from differences in accounting conventions between the two 
countries or other similar factors. However, detailed work by Blaine (1993) on this issue 
indicates that even if the data were corrected for such differences, the US rates of return will still 
be considerably greater than those of the Japanese firms. 
 
The lower Japanese profitability at the micro economic level (relative to the US) is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the much higher share of profits in aggregate output in the former 
country, compared with the latter.  Indeed many economists regard it as a virtue of the Japanese 
financial system which allows Japanese firms to continue to survive and to invest even when 
their rates of return are very low.  Moreover, the implied lower "hurdle rate" allows Japanese 
managers to undertake investments that US firms would find unacceptable.  For all the reasons 
outlined earlier, this gives Japanese corporations a competitive advantage. 
 
Singh (1995c) refers to the work of the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (1989), 
which regarded this factor as a major reason why U.S. firms lost out to the Japanese 
corporations in the U.S. home market in a wide range of electronic products.  The Commission 
investigations showed that when a Japanese firm entered one of these markets, there was a fall 
in the rate of return of the existing U.S. firms in the industry due to greater competition.  This 
often resulted in the U.S. firms leaving that industry fairly quickly and diversifying and 
investing their resources elsewhere since they could not accept such low returns.  Japanese 
companies were however able to sustain these low rates of return for long periods. 
 
Similarly, comparative survey data on managerial objectives repeatedly show that, unlike their 
American counterparts, Japanese corporate managers are much more interested in pursuing 
market share than earning a high rate of return on assets or increasing the wealth of the 
shareholders [Abegglen and Stalk, 1995; Kojima, 1995].  All this raises the important question 
as to why the Japanese managers are able to ignore performance variables commonly used in the 
US or the UK, such as movements in share prices or changes in earnings per share since the last 
financial statement. 
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The answer lies essentially in the differences in the nature of the financial system in Japan 
compared with that in Anglo-saxon countries.  There are two aspects of the Japanese financial 
system which are particularly relevant in this respect:  (a) the absence of hostile takeovers, and 
(b) the long-term relationship which typically exists between the leading Japanese corporations 
and their respective "main banks" in the kieretsu. 
 
There are many reasons why hostile takeovers are rare in Japan.  Among the most important of 
these are the distribution of shareholdings in the large Japanese corporations and the relative 
effective power of shareholders versus stakeholders in these corporations.  In such 
corporations, typically three quarters of the shares are held in "safe hands", by company's 
suppliers, buyers, its main-bank, and other such stakeholders.  Only a quarter of the shares are 
owned by outside shareholders, who in any case do not effectively have the protection or rights 
available to minority shareholders in the US or the UK. 
 
These factors make it virtually impossible to mount a hostile takeover bid against a large 
Japanese corporation.
22
  This helps to insulate Japanese managers from the "short-termism" to 
which the Anglo-saxon managers are subject.
23
   The latter are obliged to pay constant 
attention to changes in earnings per share every quarter, for if they do not come up to the 
stockmarket's expectations in this respect they may become subject to the danger of takeover. 
 
In contrast, the Japanese corporations have long term relationships with their lead banks.
24
  
These institutional features enable Japanese managers to pay scant regard to the verdict of the 
stock market; to aggressively pursue long term strategies such as increasing market share; and to 
reinvest most of their profits rather than to pay out large dividends.
25
 
 
The above characteristics of the relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
Japan complemented government policies in the 1950s and 1960s in maintaining the 
investment-profit-savings nexus. In this context it is also useful to note that the structure of the 
                                                 
    
22
 See further Odagiri(1994); Odagiri and Hess(); Singh(1995c). 
    
23
 There is a large literature on the stock market and the short termism that it typically 
engenders. For a recent review, see Singh (1995c).  See also Stein (1988, 1989); Cosh, Hughes 
and Singh (1990); Porter (1992); Kojima (1995); Froot, Perold and Stein (1992); Jacobson and 
Aaker(1993).  For an opposite point of view on the subject see Marsh (1990). 
    
24
 Instead of the takeover mechanism, the managers in the Japanese system are subject to 
internal organisational and other types of disciplines. See further Aoki (1990); Odagiri (1994); 
Aoki and Dore (1994). 
    
25
 Dore (1985) points out that in some years the total dividend payments by Japanese 
corporations were less that the aggregate amounts managers spent on their perks and 
entertainments.  He also notes from a sociological perspective the relatively low social status of 
the stock market in the Japanese society.  The top graduates in the University of Tokyo - an 
elite institution - still prefer to have careers with the government or the corporations than with 
the stock market or institutions connected with it. 
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financial system itself was not independent of government policies.  There is evidence that after 
World War II, the government deliberately adopted a number of measures which helped 
consolidate the existing bank-based financial system rather than to establish one based on the 
stockmarket.
26
 
 
 
IX.  The government, the corporation and the financial system in Korea 
 
The relationship between (a) the government and the corporations and (b) between the 
corporations and the financial system were even more important in initiating and maintaining 
high corporate as well as overall investment and savings rates in Korea than in Japan.  This is 
for the following substantive reasons. 
 
First, available comparative flow of funds data for developing countries (Honahan and Atiyas, 
1993) suggest that unlike Japan, Korea does not have a higher savings rate than other countries 
for each sector of its economy.  The high overall savings rate of the Korean economy is 
essentially due to its much larger corporate savings relative to other countries.  With respect to 
household savings, countries like India and Turkey, for example, have a larger savings rate in 
that sector than Korea (India 14.8%, Turkey 11.5%, Korea 10.3%).  However, business savings 
in Korea were 8.3% of GDP compared with 3.4% in Turkey and 1.8% in India.
27
 
 
Secondly, the history of Korean development during the last three decades is the history of the 
expansion and diversification of the chaebol - the huge conglomerates which produce a wide 
range of industrial and consumer products.  A small number of these very large firms have 
dominated the Korean economy throughout this period.  The top ten chaebol accounted for 
21% of manufacturing sales in 1977 and 30% in 1985.  By 1989, the share declined slightly to 
27%.  However, at the international level, among the 500 largest industrial companies in the 
world in 1990, there were 11 Korean companies - the same number as from Switzerland - 
whereas in the 1960s there was none.  The government played a central role, as will be seen 
below, in the creation and development of the chaebol. 
 
Thirdly, because of the low initial level of Korean development relative to that of Japan, the 
Korean state has been much more deeply and directly involved in all spheres of the economy, 
particularly in building up the competitive strength of its corporations.  After democratisation 
and continuing pressure from industrial countries to liberalize, the government's influence has 
declined compared with what it was in the high growth period of the economy (1965-1985).  It 
is nevertheless still substantial, but the following analysis, as in the case of Japan and for similar 
reasons, will concentrate on the earlier high growth period. 
                                                 
    
26
 See further Aoki and Patrick (1994); Rajan (1996). 
    
27
  As Honahan and Atiyas readily admit, the comparative "flow of funds" data on which 
these ratios are based are far from being perfect.  Apart from the deficiencies of the data 
themselves, the statistics do not refer to the same periods for the three countries.  The Korean 
figures are averaged over the period 1980-1984, while those for India and Turkey cover the 
years 1970-1982 and 1970-1981 respectively.  But this appears to be the best data we have.   
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IX.1  The role of the state: A comparison with Japan 
 
Rapid economic development and industrial catch-up in Korea began with the military coup
28
 
of General Park and very much bears the stamp of his economic philosophy.  Applying what he 
regarded as the lessons of Japanese economic development, Park made the large private 
corporation the main vehicle for "late industrialization" in Korea.  However, Park also thought 
that to ensure that private business acted in the social interest it needed careful and constant 
guidance from the government, particularly at Korea's stage of development. 
 
The Korean government followed broadly similar policies to those of Japan in its quest for rapid 
economic growth, but there were significant differences.  It is only these differences that will be 
reviewed below. 
 
(a)  In Korea, far more than in Japan, the government played a direct role in helping to create 
large conglomerate organizations by promoting mergers and directing entry and exit of firms 
according to the requirements of technological scale economies and world demand conditions.  
As UN (1993) notes with respect to Korean industrial structure:   
 
Such a structure is the deliberate creation of the government, which utilised a highly 
interventionist strategy to push industry into larger-scale, complex 
technologically demanding activities while simultaneously restricting FDI 
inflows tightly to promote national ownership.  It was deemed necessary to 
create enterprises of large size and diversity, to undertake the risk inherent in 
launching high-technology, high-skill activities that would remain competitive in 
world markets.  The chaebols acted as the representative and spearheads of the 
government strategy: they were supported by protection against imports and 
TNC entry, subsidised credit, procurement preference and massive investments 
in education, infrastructure and science-technology network. 
 
(b)  Although on the face of it Japan and Korea have similar group banking systems, there is a 
crucial difference between them.  For much of the high growth period, the Korean financial 
system was effectively under state control.  Although the Japanese banks were subject to 
government influence and guidance they were nevertheless private.  In the Korean case, 
however, where the main bank is state-controlled, the relationship between the group and the 
bank becomes rather different.  It provides the state with an extra degree of information and 
control over corporate activities than would otherwise be the case.  Lee (1992) suggests that in 
effect what the Korean government did was to create an internal capital market for allocation of 
investment resources.  Following Williamson (1975), he argues that in view of the various 
imperfections of a free capital market, particularly in a country at Korea's stage of development, 
an internal market of this kind may be more efficient. 
 
(c)  There is also a significant organizational difference between the Japanese kieretsu and the 
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  General Park Chung-Hee seized power in 1961.  He later became President and was 
assassinated in 1978. 
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Korean chaebol.  Following the dissolution of the zaibatsu, the ownership of large Japanese 
corporations is not in the hands of families but is widely dispersed, leading to the separation of 
ownership from control and thus to the complete professionalisation of the management 
function.  However, in Korea the ownership still lies predominantly with the entrepreneurial 
families.  Consequently, family members have often occupied the top managerial jobs and the 
professionalisation of management has been a slow process in that country (Amsden, 1990). 
 
(d)  Singh (1996b) notes that as in Japan, the Korean government played a critical role in 
enhancing and maintaining at a high level the corporate inducement to invest.  However, the 
state in Korea was not just a referee or a ringmaster in orchestrating investment races, it was 
also a nursemaid and a fairy godmother to the chaebol.  During the 1970s when the government 
implemented its extremely ambitious "heavy and chemical industry" (HCI) program, it virtually 
became a co-partner with the leading chaebol and "socialised" the risks involved. 
 
These risks - both technological and market - in the production and sale of sophisticated new 
products were indeed formidable for the Korean private corporations.  Left to themselves, the 
private sector may not have undertaken these risky investments at all.  However, goaded by the 
government, provided with finance at subsidised rates through the nationalised banking system, 
the fiercely competitive top chaebol were more than willing to fully participate in these new 
ventures.  This is well illustrated by the story of the production of microwave ovens by the 
Korean company Samsung Industries, as told by an institution, the World Bank, not particularly 
known for its support of the state nursemaiding of industrial production. 
 
The government's Economic Development Board was a key player in Samsung's 
success.  Government officials were keenly aware that the Republic of Korea 
could not rely forever on low wage manufacturing.  Just as the United States 
had lost countless textile industry jobs to Korea, they reasoned, so Korea would 
one day find it could no longer compete for labour-intensive manufacturing jobs 
with low-wage neighbours such as China and Indonesia.  To prepare for that 
day, government officials, working in consultation with the private sector, 
developed incentives for new knowledge- and capital-intensive industries.  
Incentives varied widely and included the government's building industrial 
parks, subsidising utilities, giving tax rebates for exports, and making cheap 
loans for investment in new products.  By 1980, urged forward by subsidies and 
incentives, Korean industry had moved into steel, ships, and even cars and was 
about to leap into world class electronics. 
 
Samsung made good use of these measures; company managers met frequently with 
government officials to trade ideas and projects.  Even so, penetrating the world 
microwave market dominated by Japan was no easy task.  By the late 1970s, 
when global production hit 5 million per year, Samsung had made a total of only 
1,460 microwave ovens. The company's first break came in 1980, when a US 
department store, looking for cheaper substitutes, ordered several thousand 
ovens.  Soon production had risen to 100,000.  When General Electric, unable 
to keep pace with the Japanese competition, decided to stop manufacturing 
microwaves itself and import the ovens under its own label instead, Samsung 
was a logical choice.  The company has never looked back, and it now exports 
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the ovens under its own name as well as buyers' labels. (World Bank, 1993, pp. 
130) 
 
(e)  Although both Japan and Korea emphasized exports in their industrial strategies, the 
Korean authorities have pursued this objective much more vigorously.  This is reflected in 
some comparative statistics: in Japan's high growth period the share of exports in GDP 
increased only to a small degree, from 6.5% in the early 1950s to less than 9% in the early 
1970s.  Korean exports, on the other hand, rose from less than 5% of GDP in 1963 to nearly 
35% in 1980 (Krueger, 1995). 
 
 
IX.3  Investment, savings and profits 
 
Unlike for advanced countries, very little data is available on comparative profits and rates of 
return for developing countries.  However, recent research by Jang (1995) on Korean profits at 
the macroeconomic level indicates that the profit share (gross manufacturing profits as a 
proportion of gross manufacturing output) during the period 1963-1975 was quite high, ranging 
between 40% and 45%.  In the late 1970s, the share began to decline and in the 1980s it ranged 
between 30% and 39%.  The reasons for this decline must lie partly in the tighter labour market 
conditions and the increasing power of workers and trade unions, especially in the period 
leading up to democratization in 1989. However, as in the case of Japan, the Korean profits 
particularly during the high growth period, were higher than what they would otherwise have 
been without the government policies of protection against imports and the absence of adequate 
domestic competition policies.
29
 
 
The previous sections have analyzed the role of the government and the financial system in 
inducing and sustaining high corporate  investment rates in the Korean economy.  We turn 
now to the important question of savings.  How did the domestic savings ratio rise from 3.3% 
of GDP during 1955-1965 to almost 35% between 1980-1995?  In the 1960s and 1970s foreign 
savings played a major but waning role in Korean economic growth.  By the 1980s, foreign 
savings had become negative (i.e. Korea was running a current account surplus) and domestic 
savings had greatly increased as a consequence of rising savings both in the corporate and 
personal sector.  The growth in corporate sector savings was largely due to the high corporate 
investment rates and high retention ratios of the Korean corporations.  However, the 
government, through its anti-consumption policies was also involved in helping raise the 
personal sector's propensity to save. These anti-consumption policies included instructions to 
the banks, largely state owned, not to extend consumer credit, prohibitive tariffs or non tariff 
barriers on imported luxury goods. One result of these policies, was a very low car ownership in 
Korea. Chang, 1994 (pp. 109-110) observes: 
 
                                                 
    
29
 Nevertheless, even more so than in Japan, the government encouraged fierce rivalry among 
large oligopolistic firms and enforced strict performance standards on firms receiving any state 
benefits. Moreover, during the 1980s the government embarked on a gradual programme of 
liberalisation as well as of greater competition in the domestic markets. For a fuller discussion, 
see Amsden and Singh (1994). 
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"Despite Korea being a major exporter of passenger-cars, Koreans have owned far fewer 
passenger cars than people in other developing countries with a comparable 
income level...Given such a clear (stated and revealed) anti-consumption bias, 
Korean macroeconomic policy may be more appropriately understood as 
"investment management" rather than as "aggregate-demand management".  ( 
 
The following aspects of the observed enormous growth of Korean savings during the last three 
decades deserve attention. 
 
First, it could be argued that the rise in personal savings is entirely due to the growth in 
household incomes and have little to do with the government's anti-consumption policies.  
Growing per capita incomes were no doubt important in increasing the propensity to save.  
However, as UNCTAD (1994) rightly notes, income growth is not translated automatically into 
high savings growth.  There was relatively little increase in the average savings ratios of many 
leading Latin American countries from 1960-1980 despite a fairly fast increase in per capita 
incomes.  Similarly, in the 1990s, although Latin American growth has revived there has been 
no increase in the savings rate in many countries (Edwards, 1995). 
 
Secondly, Korean savings seem to have been invariant to changes in real interest rates.  For 
much of the high growth period in Korea there was considerable financial repression, and yet 
savings continued to rise (Dornbush and Park, 1987; Cho and Khatkhate, 1989). 
 
Thirdly, savings in Korea during the high growth period would also have been positively  
affected by the high level of corporate profits for the reasons mentioned earlier with respect to 
Japan.  During the 1970s, bonus payments to workers constituted between 14% and 33% of the 
total Korean wage bill, a somewhat higher figure than cited earlier for Japan.  Similarly, as in 
Japan, profits of unincorporated enterprises in Korea are included in the household sector; for 
reasons mentioned earlier, the propensity to save out of such profits and to invest is likely to be 
very high. 
 
 
X.  Summing up 
 
To sum up, the foregoing analysis of the accumulation process in Japan and Korea has 
emphasised the significance of government policies and of government business interactions, as 
well as that of the relationship between the corporation and the financial system. These policies 
and the relationships have been critical in the operation of the observed virtuous circle of high 
investment - high profits - and high savings in these economies during their respective [periods 
of fast economic growth. 
 
The workings of the investment-profits-savings nexus in the two exemplar East Asian 
economies may be contrasted with the situation ion Latin American countries and in the former 
USSR. There is evidence (see Section XII below) that profits in many Latin American 
economies have been very high, but these have not lead either to larger investment or savings 
rates. In the former Soviet Union on the other hand, there have been high rates of investment 
and savings but these have not been related to market generated profits. Such investment has 
therefore not had the same large positive impact on economic growth as that experienced by the 
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East Asian economies.
30
 
 
 
XI.  Implications for development thinking 
 
We now bring together the threads of the previous discussion in order to examine its 
implications for development thinking and practice.  The next section will consider what useful 
policy lessons, if any, can be drawn from this analysis  for the Latin American countries in the 
context of the new global economic order. 
 
With regard to development thinking, the first point which emerges from this paper concerns the 
role of large domestically owned third world firms in economic development. This subject has 
received very little attention in the literature. The literature emphasises capital accumulation but 
studies it by and large at a macroeconomic level.  The question of investment allocation is 
indeed examined at a microeconomic level, but it is done within the context of cost-benefit 
analysis of investment projects. However, economists have been slow to recognise the fact that 
industrialisation and development are actually carried out by firms, organisations and 
managements. We have not so far begun to develop an analytical perspective on the nature and 
role of these entities in carrying out industrial development. There is no theory of the third 
world firm.  Is a large third world firm much like a large firm in the advanced countries or are 
there important differences between the two?   
 
To illustrate the significance of this point it is useful to draw attention to Aoki's (1990) work on 
the differences between Japanese and Anglo-Saxon firms.  Aoki has emphasised the 
differences between the two groups of firms with respect to (a) their relationship with their 
workers; (b) their respective managerial cultures; (c) relationships with the providers of finance; 
(d) relationships with their suppliers and sub-contractors; (e) their respective ownership 
patterns.  He has formalised these differences into a distinct theory of the  Japanese firm. 
 
There are indeed very important differences between large third-world firms and those in the US 
and Western Europe both today and in the past when these countries themselves were 
industrialising. It is a remarkable fact that the large private sector third-world firms tend to be 
highly diversified industrial groups operating in a number of unrelated fields, i.e. they are what 
might be called "irrational" conglomerates. This kind of 'group' business organisation seems to 
have arisen in countries with diverse cultures, institutions and historical development.  Such 
widely diversified groups comprise the leading firms in India, Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina 
and many other countries. Of the 31 largest private industrial enterprises in the semi-industrial 
countries in 1987, 27 were diversified groups which were mostly family controlled.(Amsden 
and Hikino, 1994). 
 
The large third world firms have been increasing their share of world output.  In 1962 there 
were only four third world firms - two from South Africa, one from India and one from Turkey 
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 Akyuz and Gore (1996). With respect to the Soviet Union, Delong and Summers make a 
similar point in explaining why high investment rates in plant and equipment in that regime did 
not generate the same degree of economic growth as in the market economies. 
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among the five hundred largest industrial enterprises in the world.  By 1992 this number had 
risen to thirty three, which included twelve Korean companies.
31
 
 
The special characteristics of contemporary giant third-world firms need systematic 
investigation. How for example, do large Latin American "groups" differ from Asian "groups". 
Is it true that, as some students suggest, in the typical Latin American "group", corporations 
control the group bank, while it is the other way round in East Asia?  
 
Secondly, the main part of the paper has provided an analysis of the high corporate rates of 
savings and investment in East Asian economic development.  Apart from its own interest, this 
emphasis is also significant for another important analytical and policy reason.  It will be 
recalled that the recently concluded Uruguay Round Agreements have, in addition to trade 
liberalization, also extended multilateral rules and disciplines to a number of policy areas 
affecting industrial development and competitiveness with regard to both goods and services.  
Such policies -- generally defined as industrial policies -- have been extensively used in the past, 
notably by fast growing East Asian countries, to foster exports and to achieve rapid structural 
change and economic growth.  
 
However, a number of these policies will fall foul of the Agreements, particularly in respect to 
provisions on trade related investment measures (TRIMS) (See further Singh, 1996a).  This 
could seriously handicap developing countries who wish to emulate the example of the 
successful East Asian economies.   
 
There is however a way out of this predicament. This is because even though the post-Uruguay 
Round trading regime may restrict the use of a number of instruments of industrial policy with 
respect to the promotion of exports and the control of imports, it does not regulate government 
policies towards domestic savings and investments. In analytical terms, the focus on raising the 
propensities to save and invest can be regarded as an alternative way of enhancing a country’s 
long term international competitiveness.  
 
Historically, the East Asian governments have promoted international competitiveness by 
following both sets of policies simultaneously - i.e. the normal industrial and commercial 
policies with respect to exports and imports as well as policies which enhance savings and 
investments.  Pursuing complementary means to attain the same ends would appear to be the 
optimal policy stance for even if one set of measures do not fully succeed, the others may work 
better and help reach the target.  However, if the WTO regime effectively rules out over time 
traditional industrial policy, the other policy measures acting on the propensities to save and 
invest, can by themselves, still promote technical change and international competitiveness. 
This will particularly be so for the more developed of the industrialising countries, for example, 
Malaysia, Korea, or Thailand. 
 
Thirdly, another implication of the analysis of savings, investment and profits in this paper for 
development thinking concerns income and wealth distribution.  As noted earlier a striking 
aspect  of the success of the exemplar East Asian countries is that they have been able to 
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achieve fast economic growth while maintaining a relatively equal distribution of income. 
However, an  important question is what has happened to wealth distribution? It is well known 
that in Japan and Korea, the land reform under US auspices led to a relatively equal initial 
distribution of income and wealth. However, in the subsequent industrialisation of these 
countries, corporate profits, savings and investment increased enormously. Industrial 
concentration may not have increased but it has remained high. [ Amsden and Singh, 1994]. 
One would expect in these circumstances that, other things being equal, the wealth distribution 
in the urban economy will become more unequal. UNCTAD (1994) suggests that there is 
indirect evidence that this is what has actually happened. If so, this may require revision of 
political economy interpretations which are extant and which assume that neither income nor 
wealth distribution has worsened in East Asian economies.
32
 
 
The question of wealth distribution in these countries therefore requires systematic research. If 
the wealth distribution, despite high corporate profits, savings and investments, did not become 
more unequal over time, what market or non-market mechanisms prevented that?  If it did 
become more unequal, what are its implications for the political economy of these countries?  
In principle it is quite possible that even if there is no trade off between growth and income 
inequality there may well be one between growth and wealth inequality. 
 
 
XII.  Lessons for Latin America? 
 
I turn now to the more difficult question: what are the lessons of the East Asian story for Latin 
American countries?  Can the Latin Americans learn anything from the East Asians on, for 
example, how to improve their corporate savings and investment record?  This is a complex 
issue because although the lessons of the East Asian experience are clear enough, there does not 
appear to be the appropriate political conjuncture for Latin Americans to be willing either to 
heed such advice or to learn from that experience. 
 
This Latin American political conjuncture, whereby most governments in the region are in one 
form or another following the Washington Consensus and abandoning long-held dirigiste 
policies, coincides with a broader movement in the world economy towards liberalisation and 
globalisation.  In this overall context, the following points in relation to the relevance of the 
East Asian experience for Latin America seem to me to be significant. 
 
First, it is clear that the successful East Asian countries have not followed the "market friendly" 
approach as enunciated in its classic form in World Bank (1991). Market friendly can mean all 
things to all people. In order to prevent the concept from being a mere tautology, the World 
Bank (1991), to its credit, defined market friendly fairly precisely as follows: a) intervene 
reluctantly, b) apply checks and balances, and c) intervene openly.  As is evident from the 
discussion in this paper as well as from much scholarship in this area
33
, the East Asian 
governments did not intervene reluctantly: rather, they pursued vigourous and purposeful 
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industrial policies.
34
  Nor did they intervene openly or transparently as evidenced by the 
widespread use of administrative guidance.  They did, however, apply checks and balances in 
the form of performance standards (notably with respect to exports) in return for subsidies and 
other government concessions.  In relation to corporate investment and savings, the 
government again, as seen in previous sections, had a major role in raising and maintaining at a 
high level the corporate propensity to invest.  It used, inter alia, trade, financial and competition 
policies to create "rents" which boosted corporate profits, but it also took steps to ensure that 
these rents were not consumed but were translated into investment.  With the blessings of the 
government, if not its outright control, the financial system worked in such a way that the 
managers were able to pursue long-term investment strategies rather than being constrained by 
short-term goals of profitability and earnings per share.  Thus, these prolonged high corporate 
investment rates which have been critical to East Asian growth were not simply the result of 
getting the macroeconomic fundamentals right and in achieving low and stable inflation but 
rather the outcome of a visible process of government intervention. 
 
Secondly, in the current context of liberalisation and globalisation, the East Asians have been 
reluctant liberalizers.  Contrary to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the East Asian countries 
during the last three decades have not sought close integration with the world economy but 
rather what I have called elsewhere a "strategic integration" - i.e. they have integrated up to the 
point and in the spheres where it was in their interest to do so.  Thus, they have traditionally 
been open with respect to exports but not so open with respect to imports.  It was noted in the 
introduction to this essay that by the year 2000 South Korea is expected to become the  fourth 
largest car producer in the world.  Even now it has sizeable exports to the United States and 
Western Europe and yet in 1995 the country imported only 4,000 cars.  Although somewhat 
self-serving, many students of the Japanese economy would endorse the following recent 
complaint
35
 from the Federation of Swedish Industries concerning the "Asian way" of doing 
business: 
 
...it is necessary to face the new challenges presented to the present international trading 
system by "the Asian way" of regulation and of business.  So far this challenge 
has been encountered mainly in relation to Japan, which has adhered to (almost) 
every letter in the GATT agreement, and at the same time managed to 
circumvent the spirit of the agreement by maintaining  various formal and 
informal non-tariff barriers to imports, which have resulted in continued large 
surpluses.  Only recently have these barriers begun to be dismantled, but the 
surplus is still large.  These barriers combined with structural surpluses have 
shaken the confidence of the general public  and of many economic operators in 
the fairness of the system, and contributed to continuous  and rising pressures 
for increased protection in Europe and in North America from sectors  which 
feel hurt by such policies.  We also see the Koreans and the Chinese emulating  
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important parts of the Japanese practices, while the records of South East Asian 
nations are more mixed.
36
 
 
The East Asians have similarly been less than forthcoming in implementing financial 
liberalisation. 
 
Thirdly, both in relation to trade and financial liberalisation, the contrast between the East Asian 
and  the Latin American countries could not be more striking.  The Latin Americans have 
enthusiastically reduced tariffs and trade barriers as well as capital controls.
37
  The central issue 
is: will the liberalisation experiment succeed in terms of evoking an adequate supply response?  
Although the jury is still out, so far the evidence is not very favourable to the Washington 
Consensus.  Despite the huge capital inflows in the 1990s, the Latin American growth rate in 
the first half of the decade has only been about 3 percent per annum.  This is roughly half the 
long term rate (6% p.a. between 1965 and 1980, see Table 1) achieved in the bad old days of 
dirigiste policies.  More importantly it is also coincidentally less than half the rate required, on 
past statistical relationships, to provide remunerative employment for just the new entrants to 
the fast growing Latin American labour forces.
38
  Similarly, in relation to corporate profits and 
investment, Palma (1996) reports for a sample of six Latin American countries for which he had 
comparable data that the share of profits in GNP in these economies increased by ten percentage 
points (from 50 to 60 percent) with the recovery that started in 1987.  However, corporate 
savings and investment hardly increased at all.  There is also evidence that the commodity 
composition of Latin American exports is moving in the adverse direction, i.e. towards those 
products where world demand is expected to grow slowly.
39
 
 
It would appear  to an observer of Asian economic development that the precipitate and 
uncontrolled trade liberalisation which occurred in Latin America in the 1980s was probably not 
well-timed.  It took place when Latin American industry was competitively weak because of 
the low levels of investment during the course of the debt crisis.  However, the situation seems 
to have been made doubly difficult for the real economy in many countries by the financial 
liberalisation which has been implemented towards the end of the last decade.  In the wake of 
the financial crisis which overwhelmed Mexico in December 1994,  Latin American economies 
have already paid a heavy price for this liberalisation in terms of loss of output.  Further, stock 
markets have played a key role in the internal and external financial liberalisation process which 
has taken place.  Apart from the macroeconomic effects of financial liberalisation, it is arguable 
that the consequent growing hegemony of the stock market in these economies may at the 
microeconomic level hinder rather than help industrialisation and economic growth.  Long ago 
Keynes observed (Keynes, 1936, p. 139) that " when the capital development of a country 
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becomes the byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."  The 
enormous fluctuations on the Latin American stock markets in the recent period unrelated to any 
fundamentals,
40
 would appear to confirm Keynes' characterisation of such markets as casinos.  
Even if the Latin American industry can bear the burden of trade liberalisation, the cross of 
financial liberalisation may be crippling.
41
 
 
However, as noted earlier, the jury on the supply response and the real economy is still out. If 
adequate supply response continues to be elusive, at what point will the architects of the 
Washington consensus be willing to admit that the experiment has failed? 
 
XIII. Postscript 
 
In response to the above question which came at the end of the paper actually presented at the 
Conference, John Williamson, in an intervention, provided a clear answer. He thought that five 
more years were needed to properly assess the validity of the policy program prescribed by the 
Washington consensus. Senor Bianchi, in making an eloquent intervention in support of John 
Williamson's plea that more time is required, pointed out that these ideas have been 
implemented for the longest period in Chile where they have been extremely successful. In a 
comment on the original paper, Professor Lui drew attention to the case of Hong Kong as an 
East Asian example of fast economic development which did not require dirigiste policies. 
 
These and other interventions and comments were very helpful as it allows us now to explore a 
bit further the ideas put forward above in the last section of the paper. It will be useful to begin 
first by commenting briefly on the cases of Chile and Hong Kong, before discussing directly 
John Williamson's idea of allowing "five more years" for the neo-liberal program. 
 
XI11.1 Chile 
 
Senor Bianchi is of course quite right to draw attention to the case of Chile, which, alone among 
Latin American economies has achieved successful economic growth over the last ten years. 
The Chilean example, however, immediately raises the question of why only its real economy 
has responded successfuly and adequately to Washington consensus policies and those of other 
countries have not? Leaving aside the question of the long-term sustainability of the Chilean 
model (see below), this suggests that there may be unique aspects of the Chilean political 
economy which may not be present in other Latin American countries. Thus, even if the Chilean 
model was sustainable, it may not be replicable in other countries on the continent . 
 
The unique features of the Chilean political economy which come immediately to mind are: a) 
the Pinochet military dictatorship which assumed power in 1973 and b) the associated early 
introduction of the neo-liberal model in that country. The latter involved internal and external 
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liberalization including, notably, the destruction of the power of the trade unions and the 
consequent more or less complete deregulation of the labour market. In the external sphere, 
Chile first abolished all non-tariff barriers and over a relatively short period of time thereafter 
reduced tariffs to an average level of 10%
42
. This more or less free-trade regime was combined 
with the liberalization of capital movements. In the event, the neo-liberal model was not 
successful in the first decade of its operation. Unregulated capital flows resulted in a huge surge 
of loans from abroad during the period 1978-1981, contracted mainly by the private sector. This 
led to an unsustainable appreciation of the currency, and the ensuing financial crisis resulted in a 
huge 15% reduction in GDP during the depression of 1982-1983. 
 
The recovery from the depression and the fast economic growth of the last decade was greatly 
facilitated by the rise in the price of the copper in 1987 and another surge in capital flows which 
began in Chile somewhat earlier than in other Latin American countries.
43
 However, these 
favourable external shocks were only translated into sustained growth by, inter alia, two 
fundamental factors. Firstly, the government, having learned the hard lessons of the previous 
surge of capital inflows, has in the recent period adopted highly pragmatic and interventionist 
policies towards such inflows and the management of the exchange rate. It is now fully 
recognized that is important for exports and for the real economy that a competitive real 
exchange rate should be maintained, and it is acknowledged that this cannot simply be left to the 
market forces. 
 
Consequently, the Chilean authorities have adopted policies to influence both the level and the 
composition of capital inflows, encouraging long-term inflows such as FDI and discouraging 
speculative short-term capital flows. Ffrench-Davis, Agosin and Uthoff (1995) note that the 
Chilean government has used four basic instruments to neutralize any effects that, as a result of 
the influx of short-term capital, may be inconsistent with the objectives of the export 
development strategy. These instruments are: the application of taxes and reserve requirements 
to capital inflows; an exchange-rate policy based on dirty floating of the exchange rate in 
relation to a reference value pegged to a basket of currencies; open market operations to sterilize 
the monetary effects of exchange-rate dealings, and the prudent supervision of financial 
markets. 
 
Apart from these regulations and interventions in the foreign exchange and in the financial 
markets, there is a second major factor which has been salient in the Chilean authorities ability 
to maintain a competitive real exchange rate. This derives from the fact that the labour markets 
in Chile are more unregulated and "flexible" than in other countries. Consequently, unlike a 
nimber of other Latin American economies the Chilean government does not have to use the 
nominal exchange rate as an anchor to reduce unflationary expectations. (Such policies, 
experience suggests, inevitably lead to real appreciation of the currency during episodes of 
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capital surges). 
 
Further, notwithstanding its undoubted success both in exports and overall economic growth in 
the last ten years, there are important questions about how good an example Chile is for other 
countries to follow and about the sustainability of its export performance.   The first point is 
that Chile's exports are basically local natural-resourced based and largely unprocessed.  
Compared with the standards of Asian NICs, Chile's manufactured exports are tiny - only $1.3 
billion in 1992 versus for example $70 billion for Taiwan in the same year.  Taiwan's 
population is about a third more than that of Chile, but even on a per capita basis, Chile exports 
were $96 per capita and Taiwan's $3500. 
 
Secondly, as table 10 suggests, the commodity composition of Chilean exports is among the 
most unfavourable of the 15 leading industrialising countries in the sample. Only 12 per cent of 
Chile's exports to the OECD countries go  to the twenty dynamic sectors where demand is 
growing fastest. The corresponding figures for the first-tier Asian  NICs (Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Taiwan) are in the 80s. Chile is often compared with the second-tier NICSs (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia) in terms of its export achievement. However, the shares of the latter 
countries'  exports  going to the most dynamic sectors of OECD demand are 61 per cent in 
Malaysia and 67 per cent in Thailand. Indeed table 10 suggests that among the Latin American 
countries the Mexican and Brazilian export structures are much more dynamic than those of 
Chile. 
 
Of course it could be argued that despite an unfavourable commodity composition of its exports, 
a country can achieve fast expansion of its exports by increasing its share even in slow growing 
markets. That is in fact what Chile has done over the last decade or more. This will however be 
more difficult in the future as Chilean real wages rise. This is not only because most Chilean 
exports go to sectors where demand growth is slow , but in many of them, the scope for further 
productivity improvements may also be limited. Data presented in table 11 suggests that after 
more than 80% of the Chilean exports which go to the less dynamic sectors, so in about half of 
these, Chile was increasing its market share whilst in the other half, its share was declining. (In 
the small dynamic portion of its exports Chile did have a rising market share) By way of 
contrast , for Korea, not only were most (82 per cent) of its exports in the dynamic sectors (see 
table 10), but Korea also had a rising market share in 83 per cent of these dynamic products 
(table 11). The essential reason for the export dynamism of Asian NICs lies in their purposive 
industrial policy programme to continuously upgrade their respective industrial and export 
structures as real wages rise. This accords with the "flying geese" pattern of development 
ascribed to the Asian countries
44
. Chile has also upgraded its exports over the last twenty years 
but the improvements have been confined to restructuring within the slow growing sectors 
rather than a progressive movement towards the more dynamic sectors. Lall (1995 p151), 
observes: 
 
"...that despite two decades of stringent policy reforms intended to free its economy 
from government intervention, Chile has failed to transform its manufacturing 
sector into an engine of export growth.  It has not been able to "do a Taiwan 
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China".  It is not that Chile lacks the human resources it needs to develop its 
industrial exports.  It has one of the best educational systems in Latin America, 
as well as a base of entrepreneurship and substantial experience with 
industrialization as far back as the nineteenth century..........The presence of 
human capital has helped Chile in boosting resource-based exports, but the 
creation of new competitive advantages in industry has been severely 
constrained, in the absence of policy support, by the learning costs inherent in 
upgrading and deepening industry." 
 
 
XIII.2 Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong is certainly an example of a country which has followed broadly laissez faire 
policies with regard to trade and capital flows and achieved fast economic growth.  However, 
as in the case of Chile there are special features of the Hong Kong situation which require 
attention.  First, Hong Kong started with an enormous advantage of a pool of skilled labour and 
entrepreneurs with capital who migrated from Shanghai after the Chinese revolution.   
 
 
Secondly, Hong Kong has long been an entreport city with well established firms possessing 
considerable export capabilities.  There has therefore been much less need than in other NICs 
for the government to intervene to build up production and export capacities.   
 
Nevertheless it is important to note that Hong Kong has not been as successful as other Asian 
NICs in upgrading its industrial and export structure. Although table 11 shows that more than 
90 per cent of Hong Kong's exports are in the dynamic sectors, table 12 indicates that in about 
half of them Hong Kong has been losing its market share.  Rising real wages in the colony has 
lead to the relocation of its industry abroad (mainly to mainland China). Consequently Hong 
Kong has suffered massive deindustrialisation in the last 10 years, with a 35 per cent fall in 
manufacturing employment. There is evidence that Hong Kong's decision makers are deeply 
worried about the erosion of the city's industrial base.  The Financial Times (1993) noted in its 
survey of Hong Kong: 
 
"The laissez faire prop against which the Hong Kong government has leaned 
since 1841 has prevented it from adopting the ambitious 
strategies that have spawned the computer components and 
telecommunications products of Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan.  But as Hong Kong continues to evolve into a financial 
and services centre, the pressures of some of the highest land and 
labor costs in Asia appear to have given the government second 
thoughts about its stance....The government is taking serious 
measures to encourage the inflow of overseas technologies, so 
that Hong Kong can retain some kind of industrial base....The 
government has toned down its laissez faire inclinations to 
permit a new applied research and development scheme.  This is 
a $HK 200m. fund, which will match the investment of any 
start-up company which fulfils certain criteria, in exchange for an 
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equity stake.  This represents the first step towards direct 
government funding for research and development, and by 
implication, the creation of a Government industrial policy."
45
 
 
It is also true that despite the deindustrialisation, the Hong Kong economy has continued to 
prosper.   This is because the colony has been able to shift from manufacturing into high value 
financial services.  It is perfectly possible for a city state with a small population and an 
increasingly industrialised hinterland to exist largely, if not entirely on the basis of the 
production and export of services.  But for most countries,this is normally not feasible because 
of the high income elasticity of demand for manufactures and the much more limited scope for 
the exports of services relative to those of industrial products.
46
 
 
XIII.3  'Five More Years' 
 
At one level John Williamson's suggestion  that the Washington Consensus (WC) programme 
requires five more years to show its full results may seem reasonable.  The programme 
embodies enormous institutional changes - a much diminished role for the state and a 
correspondingly far larger space for the markets to function freely; and in the external sphere, a 
move away from a 'sheltered' economy to  greater openness and a much closer integration with 
the world economy.  It clearly takes time for economic agents to accept and adapt to the far 
reaching environmental changes of this type and magnitude.  
 
Unfortunately however, the WC programme is not simply a scientific experiment to advance the 
cause of economic or social science but something which affects the actual lives and well-being 
of hundreds of millions of people.  Citizens of Mexico, for example, have already waited for 
more than ten years - Mexico after all has been Washington's star pupil ever since the beginning 
of the debt crisis in the early 1980s.  The Mexican people and those in a number of other Latin 
American countries may simply not be prepared to wait for another five years, particularly if the 
programme continues not to work in terms of real economic growth, jobs and poverty 
alleviation.  The result may then be another violent swing of the pendulum which could go too 
far in the other direction and thereby jeapordise such gains as the WC has secured in the sphere 
of stabilisation (eg. the correction of fiscal disequilibria in many countries).    
 
As two leading proponents of the reform, Burki and Edwards (1996)
47
 have recently noted, 
 
"The slow recovery of the ...(Latin American) economies is troublesome for a number of 
economic, social and political reasons.  In many countries, modest economic 
performance over the last few years is generating impatience and a sense of 
disappointment with the reform process.  An increasing number of people are 
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disillusioned and beginning to look at alternative policies.  Although this 
disenchantment has not been translated into an activist "anti-reform" movement, 
it is slowly generating "reform-skepticism."  What makes this particularly 
disturbing is that the reform-skeptics do not have a coherent plan and tend to 
offer an assortment of mutually inconsistent policies with an unmistable populist 
flavor." 
 
Burki and Edwards go on to suggest , 
 
"The sluggish behaviour of ...(Latin American) labor markets - low wages and slow 
employment creation  - constitutes one of the gravest concerns of Latin 
American populations and has serious economic, social and political 
consequences.  It contributes to poverty - many of the poor are unemployed, or 
employed at very low wages in the informal sector - and it erodes the political 
support of reformist governments.  There is some preliminary evidence 
suggesting that in many - if not in most - Latin American countries the positive 
impact of lowered inflation on political support is beginning to fade and voters 
are now demanding improved performance in terms of higher growth, wages and 
employment.  If  these are not delivered, it is likely that voters will begin to 
desert the reformist ranks, increasing the risk of populist relapse." 
 
 
If in the light of the above considerations, five years would appear to be too long to wait, can 
anything be done in the interim?  Burki and Edwards prescribe a continuation of the reform 
process towards its next phase.  They acknowledge that these "institutional "second generation" 
reforms are technically very difficult and are likely to take time to be implemented and to 
generate their beneficial effects.  Countries will tend to proceed cautiously and are likely to 
make mistakes.  This process may generate frustration and, at times, disenchantment.  A great 
deal of leadership and consensus building will be needed to push forward with the much needed 
next phase of the reform process."  Specifically, for the two World Bank economists the next 
phase of the WC would give priority to the reform of the labour market, the educational and 
health systems and above all it would redefine the role of the state.  The latter, in this 
conception  would essentially be a "night-watchman", if not a "minimalist" state. 
 
Although the Burki and Edwards assessment of the gravity of the present situation is well taken, 
there are difficulties with their diagnosis and remedies.  There are two points that are 
particularly problematical.  Firstly, the two authors ascribe low wages and the rise in 
unemployment and underemployment in Latin-American countries largely to the rigidities of the 
labour market.  This conclusion is however difficult to accept in the light of evidence over the 
last 15 years.  In static terms, there may well be many rigidities and imperfections in 
Latin-American labour markets, but it is important to appreciate that over time the latter have 
responded well and quickly to economic changes.  Real wages fell by as much as 50% in 
countries like Mexico during the economic downturn  of the 1980's and rose somewhat in the 
subsequent upturn.  In other words, markets have been "dynamically" flexible.  True, real 
wages in Mexico or in other countries have not been as flexible as in Chile.  But, even if that 
were desirable for most Latin-American countries, it would not be feasible in their present 
democratic context. 
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The second main difficulty with the Burki-Edwards proposals is that these involve further 
institutional changes which are likely to take a long time to deliver.   The proposed 
"second-generation" reforms do not address the question of people's present frustrations and 
impatience with the WC policies - a central issue that the two authors themselves highlight as 
seen above. 
 
In the spirit of provoking a constructive debate this paper would like to propose a rather 
different course of action.   The underlying hypothesis here is that under the aegis of the WC, 
the Latin-American countries opened up too much and too suddenly to the international 
economy, both in the financial and product markets, so as to be able to sustain a desired current 
account position at the socially necessary growth rate of 5-6% per annum.  This hypothesis is 
motivated by the Asian experience and the analytical considerations presented in the main body 
of the paper. 
 
If this analysis is correct, as a minimum, Latin-American countries should carefully control 
financial flows.   The volatility of unregulated international capital flows leads to fluctuations 
in the exchange rates and stockmarket prices.  The interactions between these two inherently 
unstable markets often leads to a negative feedback loop which in turn generates fluctuations in 
real economic variables (consumption, investment, exports, etc).  All this creates an unstable 
and uncertain economic environment which inevitably effects the private sector's inducement to 
invest.  Further, in view of the apparently high income elasticity and low price elasticity of the 
demand for imports by Latin-American consumers the speed and the degree of trade openness 
which has been implemented also needs to be questioned.  These measures may have assisted 
stabilisation but they have evidently not been helpful to the Latin American industry.  The 
result is that many of these economies are running sizeable current account deficits even when 
they are operating well below their productive potential or the socially necessary growth rates.  
Thus some import controls, particularly against luxury products will not only be directly helpful 
to the real economy by alleviating the balance of payments constraint, it may also help to raise 
the propensity to save.  As Taylor (1996) notes, during the recent period, under the combined 
impact of trade and financial liberalisation the Mexican private savings fell from 15% to 5% of 
GDP. 
 
To sum up, instead of a doctrinaire pursuit of free trade and unimpeded capital flows, what is 
being proposed to help the Latin American real economy in the short to medium term is a set of 
pragmatic policies.  These policies involve interalia, considerable regulation of external capital 
flows, but preferably also a relatively modest degree of control over imports.  Unfettered capital 
markets and unrestricted trade liberalisation do not represent the optimal degree of openness for 
most Latin American economies at the present juncture. 
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TABLE 10 
 
SECTORAL ORIENTATION OF EXPORTS OF SELECTED DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN 1990 
 
 (Share in total exports of exports in fast-growing OECD import sectors
a
)  
Country  Country  
Hong Kong 91.0 Mexico 61.2 
Taiwan Province of China 83.9 Tunisia 57.9 
Singapore 83.3 Morocco 49.8 
Republic of Korea 82.0 Turkey 49.4 
  Brazil 35.5 
Thailand 66.7 Argentina 20.9 
Malaysia 60.8 Colombia 16.0 
Indonesia 39.5 Chile 12.3 
 
Source: ECLAC, Comparative Analysis of Nations data base. 
 a
 A fast-growing OECD import sector is defined as one in which  imports 
into OECD countries as a proportion of total OECD imports rose from 1963 to 
1990.(Reproduced from UNCTAD (1996)). 
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TABLE 11 
 
DYNAMISM AND COMPETITIVENESS OF EXPORTS FROM SELECTED ASIAN 
AND LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1990 
 
 Percentages 
 
 H/C L/C H/U L/U 
Republic of Korea 82.9 17.1  0.0  0.0 
Taiwan Province of China 83.8 15.2  0.0  0.0 
Hong Kong 43.8  6.3 47.2  2.7 
Singapore 83.4 16.0  0.0  0.6 
Malaysia 60.7 39.3  0.0  0.0 
Indonesia 43.8  6.3 47.2  2.7 
Thailand 66.6 31.3  0.0  2.3 
Mexico 59.1 34.4  2.0  4.5 
Brazil 33.7 53.3  1.8 11.2 
Argentina 17.6 36.8  3.3 42.3 
Chile 11.4 46.7  0.9 41.0 
 
Note: ...................? 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
